To date, 38 men have been charged with terrorism offences in Australia. Twenty-six have been convicted. The article commences with an overview of the factual circumstances leading to these convictions. This provides important background for the following discussion of a largely unexplored issue in Australian anti-terrorism law and policy, namely, the difficulties faced by the Australian courts in adapting traditional sentencing principles to the (for the most part, preparatory) terrorism offences enacted by the Commonwealth Parliament after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Of particular interest are how the courts determine the objective seriousness of these offences and the respective weight placed upon deterrence (both specific and general) and the rehabilitation of convicted terrorists.
Introduction
Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, Australia had no national anti-terrorism laws. A decade on, 54 such laws have been enacted by the Australian Parliament (Williams 2011 (Williams : 1144 . These laws represent a significant deviation from the traditional reactionary approach of the criminal law. Instead, they aim to pre-empt the commission of terrorist acts in the first place. To this end, Australia's anti-terrorism laws not only criminalise the commission of terrorist acts; they also establish a long list of preparatory, group-based and financing offences.
The terrorism offences have been aggressively enforced. A senior counter-terrorism officer with the Australian Federal Police testified in October 2007 that this organisation was directed to 'lay as many charges under the new terrorist legislation against as many suspects as possible because we wanted to use the new legislation' (Neighbour 2007) . Thirty-eight men, all but one of them Muslim, have been charged with terrorism offences in Australia to date. The charges against the men have resulted in 26 convictions (nine guilty pleas and seventeen convictions at The starting point in sentencing anyone, terrorist or otherwise, must be to identify the 'gravity of the offence viewed objectively': 'without this assessment the other factors requiring consideration in order to arrive at the proper sentence cannot properly be given their place' (R v Dodd (1991) 57 A Crim R 249 at 354). This article will consider how the courts have determined the objective gravity of the new terrorism offences. It will then go on to consider one matter that has been given particular weight (deterrence) and one matter that has been largely ignored (rehabilitation) by the Australian courts in sentencing terrorists. This provides us with an insight, albeit an incomplete one, into the difficulties faced by Australian courts in adapting traditional sentencing principles to the anti-terrorism context and in balancing the various matters relevant to the sentencing exercise.
Convictions of Australian terrorists 2
At the core of Australia's anti-terrorism legislative framework is the offence of engaging in a terrorist act (s 101.1, Criminal Code). The definition of a 'terrorist act' in s 100.1 of the Criminal Code requires that the action be done or the threat of action made with the intention of advancing a 'political, religious or ideological cause' and of coercing an Australian or foreign government or intimidating the public. Furthermore, the action must cause a minimal level of harm, being serious physical harm, serious damage to property, a person's death, the endangering of a person's life, serious risk to the health or safety of the public, or serious interference with, disruption or destruction of an electronic system. There is an exception for advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action which is not intended to cause serious physical IJCJ 20 Online version via www.crimejusticejournal.com © 2013 2(1) harm or death, endanger a person's life or create a serious risk to the health or safety of the public.
Given the recent enactment of specific anti-terrorism legislation and Australia's fortunate history of being relatively free from terrorist attacks, it is unsurprising that no one has thus far been charged with the offence of engaging in a terrorist act. Instead, the focus of law enforcement and intelligence agencies has been upon the pre-emption of terrorist acts. To this end, Div 101 of the Criminal Code makes it an offence to engage in preparatory conduct, including possessing a thing connected with preparation for a terrorist act (s 101.4, Criminal Code) and doing an act in preparation for a terrorist act (s 101.6, Criminal Code). Division 102 makes it an offence to participate in a variety of ways in the activities of a declared terrorist organisation. For example, it is an offence to direct those activities (s 102.2, Criminal Code) and to train with (s 102.5, Criminal Code) or provide support or resources to (s 102.4, Criminal Code) a terrorist organisation. Division 102 also creates status offences for membership of (s 102.3, Criminal Code) and association with (s102.8, Criminal Code) a terrorist organisation. There are also two distinct regimes criminalising the financing of terrorism (Div 103, Criminal Code; Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth) (Charter Act)).
As noted in the Introduction, 26 men have been convicted of terrorism offences in Australia. This section will briefly set out the factual background to these convictions and the sentences that were imposed. As many of the men were convicted of multiple offences, this section will discuss the convictions in chronological order (rather than by category of offence). At trial, Lodhi was acquitted of knowingly making a document connected with preparation for a terrorist act (s 101.5(1), Criminal Code), namely, aerial photos of Australian defence force establishments. He was, however, convicted of three other terrorism offences under Div 101 of the Criminal Code. First, knowingly possessing a thing connected with preparation for a terrorist act (s 101.4(1), Criminal Code), namely, a document in the Urdu language about how to make bombs. This offence carried a maximum penalty of 15 years imprisonment and Lodhi was sentenced to 10 years. Second, knowingly collecting documents connected with preparation for a terrorist act (s 101.5(1), Criminal Code), namely, two maps of the electrical supply system in Sydney. The maximum penalty and the sentence imposed were the same as for the first offence. Finally, doing an act in preparation for a terrorist act (s 101.6, Criminal Code), namely, seeking information about the availability of materials that could be used to make bombs. This offence carried a maximum penalty of life imprisonment and Lodhi was sentenced to 20 years. This sentence was to be served concurrently with the other two sentences of 10 years apiece. Defence counsel argued that Khazaal was merely a journalist who had done no more than collect publicly available information and compile a reference book. However, this was belied by the publication of the book on an extremist website and the extensive editing done by Khazaal. In particular, he had dedicated the book to 'all mujahedeen everywhere, all martyrs of Islam, prisoners languishing in the prisons of tyrants, be it infidels, apostates or hypocrites, Christians, Jews, or Infidels, idolater and apostate ' (O'Brien 2008c) . Khazaal was convicted of the first offence. However, the prosecution was unable to prove to the satisfaction of the jury the mental element required for the second offence, namely, that the defendant intended to incite others to commit a terrorist act. He was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment (with a nine year nonparole period).
Faheem Lodhi

Operation Pendennis convictions 5
In November 2005, 13 men were arrested in raids in Melbourne and charged with a range of terrorism offences. These offences related to their participation in, and support of, an informal terrorist organisation based in Melbourne and led by Abdul Nacer Benbrika. The alleged purpose of this organisation was to engage in a holy jihad in order to persuade the then Howard government to withdraw Australian troops from Iraq.
One of the charged men, Izydeen Atik, pled guilty in July 2007 to knowingly being a member of a terrorist organisation (s 102.3(1), Criminal Code) and knowingly providing support or resources -himself -to a terrorist organisation (s102.7(1), Criminal Code). He subsequently provided evidence on behalf of the prosecution at the trial of the remaining 12 men. For the first offence, which carried a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment, Atik was sentenced to five years imprisonment. At trial, seven of the remaining 12 men were also convicted of this offence. They were each sentenced to between four and five years imprisonment. Although the jury was unable to reach a verdict in relation to Shane Kent, he pled guilty after trial and received a sentence of four years and six months. For the second offence, which carried a maximum penalty of 25 years imprisonment, Atik was sentenced to seven years imprisonment. Three other men were found guilty of this offence at trial and sentenced to either seven or eight years imprisonment.
In addition to the above, a number of the men were convicted of further offences:
• Benbrika was convicted of knowingly directing the activities of a terrorist organisation (s 102.2(1), Criminal Code). The maximum penalty for this offence was 25 years imprisonment and Benbrika was sentenced to 15 years; • Aimen Joud, Ahmed Raad and Ezzit Raad were convicted of attempting to knowingly make funds available to a terrorist organisation (ss 102.6(1) and 11.1, Criminal Code).
The maximum penalty for this offence was 25 years and the men were sentenced to either four or five years imprisonment; • Benbrika and Joud were convicted of knowingly possessing a thing connected with preparation for a terrorist act (s 101.4(1), Criminal Code). The maximum penalty for this offence was 15 years and Benbrika and Joud were each sentenced to five years; • Kent pleaded guilty to recklessly making a document connected with preparation for a terrorist act (s 101.5(2), Criminal Code). The maximum penalty for this offence was 10 years and Kent was sentenced to two and a half years. Barracks, and he subsequently had a number of conversations with his close friend, El Sayed, about the ease with which an attack could be undertaken. Aweys, a Somali man and member of the same mosque as Fattal and El Sayed, contacted a sheikh in his home country to inquire as to whether it would be permissible to engage in a terrorist attack on an army barracks in Australia. The offence carried a maximum penalty of life imprisonment and each man was sentenced to 18 years imprisonment. An appeal against conviction and sentence is pending (Iaria 2012 To be sure, terrorism is a crime unto itself. It has no equal. It does not stop at, nor is it limited to, the senseless destruction of people and property. It is far more insidious in that it attacks our very way of life and seeks to destroy the fundamental values to which we ascribe -values that form the essence of our constitutional democracy.
There are two primary points of distinction between terrorism and ordinary criminal offences. First, a terrorist's intention extends beyond the commission of an individual act of violence for a personal reason, such as revenge or money. The commission of a terrorist act is part of a more systematic and public agenda. To fall within the definition of a 'terrorist act', it is necessary that an individual intend to: (a) advance a political, religious and ideological cause; and (b) coerce or influence by intimidation an Australian or foreign government or the public. Pyne has pointed out that, although terrorist acts were committed and prosecuted in Australia well before the introduction of specific terrorism offences after 9/11, the courts 'did not embark upon a lengthy examination of the ideology of the defendant' in sentencing (Pyne 2011: 167) . By contrast, the elements of the new terrorism offences now call upon sentencing courts to give particular attention to the offender's public intention. In each Australian terrorism trial, the relevant intention has been identified as religious in nature, more specifically, to advance an Islamic jihadist cause. Sentencing courts have held a particularly dim view of such religious intentions, stating that ' [t] he fanaticism that is demonstrated by the current terrorists is undoubtedly different in degree to that shown by sectarian terrorists [who] ... were not prepared to blow themselves up for their cause' (R v Barot [2007] EWCA Crim 1119 at [54] (Phillips LCJ)). Therefore, Pyne questions whether 'we are singling out terrorism as outrageous and worthy of condign punishment not based on the dangerousness of an offender's actual conduct, but because we disapprove of the ideas he or she holds' (Pyne 2011: 172) . The second distinction is that terrorist acts have the potential (and, in many cases, are intended) to endanger large sections of the community and cause mass loss of life.
These two distinctions have led Australian courts to adopt, as their starting point, the idea that all terrorism-related offences are serious in nature and the sentences imposed must reflect this.
Justice Whealy stated in Lodhi v R (2006) 199 FLR 364 at [91]-[92]:
[T]he obligation of the Court is to denounce terrorism and voice its strong disapproval of activities such as those contemplated by the offender here. … In my view, the courts must speak firmly and with conviction in matters of this kind. This does not of course mean that general sentencing principles are undervalued or that matters favourable to an offender are to be overlooked. It does mean, however, that in offences of this kind, as I have said, the principles of denunciation and deterrence are to play a substantial role.
This does not, however, explain how courts are to distinguish between different terrorism offences. This issue will be examined in the remainder of this section.
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Maximum penalty
Australia's terrorism offences are deliberately expressed in broad language and cover a multitude of sins. For this reason, it is often possible to categorise preparatory acts as falling within several different offences. To take the example of a person providing $1,000 to the LTTE, this conduct could be prosecuted under: (a) s 101.6 of the Criminal Code (doing an act in preparation for a terrorist act); (b) s 102.6 (providing funds to a terrorist organisation); (c) any of the four specific financing offences in Div 103; or (d) s 21 of the Charter Act (giving an asset to a proscribed entity). Given the considerable overlap in the substantive content of these offences, it is striking that the maximum penalties differ significantly from offence to offence. The offence of doing an act in preparation for a terrorist act carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. In contrast, the Charter Act offence carries a maximum penalty of only ten years imprisonment. [C]areful attention to maximum penalties will almost always be required, first because the legislature has legislated for them; secondly, because they invite comparison between the worst possible case and the case before the court at the time; and thirdly, because in that regard they do provide, taken and balanced with all other factors, a yardstick.
Given this, it is unsurprising that prosecutors have generally chosen to rely upon those offences that carry the greatest maximum penalty. This increases the possibility that a lengthy period of imprisonment will be imposed after conviction (R v Lodhi (2006) 199 FLR 364 at [69] The only case in which the prosecution specified a terrorist target in the indictment was that of Operation Neath. In addition to evidence of Fattal's preliminary reconnaissance at Holsworthy Army Barracks, the prosecution relied upon an intercepted telephone conversation between Aweys and a Somali sheik on 10 July 2009. Aweys said to the sheik that 'they want to enter into the military forces are stationed, the barracks. Their desire is to fan out as much as they could until they would be hit' (Munro 2010) . In sentencing the three men in R v Fattal and Ors [2011] VSC 681 at [5], King J described the planned terrorist attack in the following terms:
The Crown case was that you three, together with others, were preparing and planning for an attack on the Holsworthy Army Base in New South Wales. It was to be carried out by possibly six persons, who may or may not have included each of you. The attack was to be with guns, and the basic plan was to enter the army base and using the guns that had been obtained, to then shoot as many persons on the base as could be shot before each of those persons attacking were themselves killed. … That is the decision that the jury gave.
It is not possible to calculate, in a mathematical sense, exactly how much of the 18 year sentence was attributable to the nature of the planned terrorist attack. However, the 'evil' nature of this plan and the 'horrific' consequences if the planned terrorist attack had eventuated were mentioned by King J as relevant factors in sentencing (R v Fattal and Ors [2011] VSC 681 at [85] ).
The sentencing of the Operation Pendennis terrorists also provides some guidance as to the impact that the selection of a target might have upon the sentence imposed. Atik testified at trial that Benbrika had honed in on several terrorist targets. Had Atik's evidence as to the proposed targets been accepted, and had knowledge of those targets been proved against the prisoners other than Benbrika, their criminality in belonging to the terrorist organisation would have been commensurately greater than has been proved without Atik's evidence.
Intended harm More commonly, the prosecution has been forced to limit itself to evidence about the nature of the harm that the planned terrorist act is intended to cause. 
Proximity
An examination of the planned terrorist act -or at least the harm likely to be caused by that act -cannot be the sole factor relied upon by Australian courts to determine the objective seriousness of an offence. If that were the case, a terrorist who had only engaged in very preliminary activities would be subject to the same penalties as a terrorist who had successfully carried out a terrorist act. To mitigate this problem, it might be possible for the courts to take into account the proximity between the preparatory acts and the commission of a terrorist act. This would 'ensure that the sentence is based on what the offender actually did, not what he or she might have done' (Pyne 2011: 173 ).
An examination of proximity would also be consistent with the approach taken to sentencing for the traditional inchoate offences of attempt and conspiracy. For example, in relation to sentencing for conspiracy, 'any considerations which advert to the content and duration and reality of the conspiracy are to be taken into account ' (R v Kane (1975) [Proximity] does not determine the objective seriousness of such an offence. It does not follow that as long as the preparatory acts relied upon to constitute the offences are in their infancy criminal culpability must necessarily be low. The main focus of the assessment of objective seriousness must be the offender's conduct and the offender's intention at the time the crime was committed.
In light of the sentencing of Lodhi, Pyne concluded that the courts were reluctant 'to mitigate penalties for the new terrorism offences because the impugned conduct is far removed from any actual terrorist act' (Pyne 2011: 172 Assuming that proximity is a relevant factor, the next question is how exactly the courts are to calculate this. It is obvious that they must consider the number and nature of the particular preparatory acts and the period of time over which they were committed. In R v Elomar and Ors [2010] NSWSC 10, Whealy J took into account two other matters in sentencing the Operation Hammerli terrorists. First, the convicted men carried out their tasks in clear defiance of the authorities. They did not cease their activities upon the authorities becoming suspicious, but rather moved them underground (at [64] ). Therefore, 'there is no reason to doubt that, absent the intervention of the authorities, the plan might well have come to fruition in early 2006 or thereabouts ' (at [68] ). The second matter was the strength of their shared extremist mindset. This mindset was characterised by a hatred of non-believers, intolerance towards the Australian government and its policies, and a conviction that Muslims were obligated to pursue violent jihad so as to overthrow liberal, democratic societies and replace them with Sharia law (at [63] ). His Honour concluded in relation to this mindset that:
The driving fanaticism behind the collective mindset of the conspiracy would have ensured that events moved quickly once sufficient material had been assembled, and the authorities' surveillance thwarted or at least diminished (at [68] ).
Yet another matter that emerges from the case law is the sophistication or amateurish nature of the plan. In other words, the practical likelihood that the convicted men would have, without the intervention of the authorities, committed the planned terrorist act. ' (at [555] ). Furthermore, the moral culpability of an individual who becomes involved with an organisation of the latter class is likely to be greater because 'logic and common sense imply the probability that the offender will be committed to the terrorist philosophy and objectives of the organisation before being admitted to its membership, and so they will go into it with their eyes wide open ' (at [556] ). Therefore, the nature of the organisation is a factor that should be taken into account by a sentencing judge in deciding what range of sentence to impose.
In R v Benbrika and Ors [2009] VSC 21 at [235]
, Bongiorno stated that the seriousness of the terrorist organisation offences, and especially the membership offence, are 'principally dependent upon what the objectives of the organisation are, its capacity and how it intends to achieve those objectives'. Nevertheless, this does not mean that each of the members of a terrorist organisation has the same level of criminal culpability. Another factor at sentencing is the particular role played by each individual in the activities of the organisation. At one end of the spectrum was Benbrika:
The essence of Benbrika's criminality, ... lies in his exercising an enormous influence over the young men who followed him, and imbuing, or seeking to imbue in them, a fanatical hatred of non-Muslims and, even, those vast majority of Muslims who abhor violence as much as anyone else. The degree of his criminality, both with respect to his membership and direction of the organisation, must be judged in light of the fact that the existence of the organisation and his leadership of it created a significant risk that a terrorist act would be committed in this community (at [68] ).
At the other end of the spectrum was the youngest member of the group, Abdullah Merhi. The Victorian Court of Appeal found in Benbrika and Ors v R (2010) 29 VR 593 at [582] that his role in the organisation, and thus the objective seriousness of his offending, was significantly less than that of the other convicted men.
The role of deterrence Subsection 16A(2) of the Crimes Act explicitly requires that specific deterrence be taken into account in sentencing. Specific deterrence aims to dissuade the individual offender from committing further offences of a similar nature by imposing sanctions which demonstrate the adverse consequences of criminal activity. Courts have, however, struggled with the issue of whether convicted terrorists will actually be deterred by the imposition of harsh sentences (see, for example Whealy 2010: 35). Terrorists who set out to murder innocent citizens are motivated by perverted ideology. Many are unlikely to be deterred by the length of the sentence that they risk, however long this may be. Indeed, some are prepared to kill themselves in order to more readily kill others.
Harsh sentences will almost certainly not deter someone who is willing and plans to kill themself in the course of committing a terrorist act. The so-called 'Underwear Bomber,' for example, pled guilty in October 2011 to attempting to blow himself up on a trans-Atlantic airliner, and referred to the bomb as 'a blessed weapon to save the lives of innocent Muslims' (Oberman 2011) .
However, it is important to remember that not all terrorists are suicide bombers. As Whealy J has rightly pointed out in an extra-judicial comment, 'terrorists cannot adequately function without followers, acolytes or assistants' (Whealy 2010: 34.). The factual circumstances underlying the conviction of terrorists in Australia demonstrate that the terrorism offences cover a broad spectrum of offenders. Therefore, specific deterrence will be most relevant as a sentencing factor when an individual has merely been reckless or has committed a terrorism offence of a lower order. The latter might include 'people who simply have sympathies for the activities of an organisation like the LTTE, or who are willing to have them benefit from fundraising efforts even though there is in addition a humanitarian goal to those efforts' (R v Thambaithurai [2010 ] BCSC 1949 ).
In any event, even where the convicted terrorist is unlikely to be deterred from future acts, this does not mean that general deterrence should not be considered. In contrast to specific deterrence, general deterrence is not mentioned in s 16A(2). Nevertheless, the proportionality test spelt out in s 16A(1), as well as the continuing relevance of common law sentencing principles, mean that general deterrence will still be taken into account by a court in sentencing an individual for a federal offence (DPP v El Karhani (1990) 21 NSWLR 370). General deterrence is not aimed at the specific individual, but rather seeks to deter prospective offenders by instilling in them the fear of incurring similar sanctions. This has a particular importance in the anti-terrorism context because of the emphasis on pre-empting terrorist attacks rather than punishing them after the fact. Once again, we must keep in mind that not all those in the community who might commit a terrorist act are fanatics whom it is impossible to deter. As the Court of Appeal explained in R v Barot [2007] EWCA Crim 1119 at [45]:
It is … important that those who might be tempted to accept the role of camp followers of the more fanatic, are aware that, if they yield to that temptation, they place themselves at risk of very severe punishment.
In both judicial and extra-judicial commentary, Whealy J has expressed a personal view that heavy sentences 'probably do not' deter individuals from committing terrorist acts (Whealy 2010: 36) . In fact, his Honour has suggested that not only may sentences be ineffective as a deterrent but 'there is some danger that the imposition of stern sentences, no matter that is may be completely justified, has the capacity to inflame resentment and may encourage young Muslim men into an extremist position' (Whealy 2010: 36) . This is supported by Pyne, who states that '[l]engthy imprisonment may be counterproductive when, in the case of suicide bombers, they perceive that they have no option but death or life in prison' (Pyne 2011: 178) . Nevertheless, in R v Lodhi (2006) 199 FLR 364 at [92] , Whealy J argues that 'the court's duty is nevertheless a duty to denounce serious criminality' and 'a stand must be taken':
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The community is owed this protection even if the obstinacy and madness of extreme views may mean that the protection is a fragile or uncertain one. … There is also a need to recognise that the imposition of a substantial sentence may have a personal impact as a deterrent on this offender so that upon his release he will, it is cautiously hoped, be unlikely or less likely to re-offend. In addition to general deterrence, the need to deter this man from future offences is a potent factor in the sentencing process.
Prospects of rehabilitation
The final issue that this article seeks to address is the extent to which sentencing courts have taken into account an offender's prospects of rehabilitation. That is, the likelihood that the values of the offender can be changed and he or she returned to the community as a law-abiding citizen. The standard approach taken in both Australian and foreign terrorism trials seems to be that rehabilitation is (at most) a subsidiary factor at sentencing (R v Martin [1998] This criminal enterprise was not in any sense motivated, as criminal activities so often are, by a need for financial gain or simply private revenge. Rather, an intolerant and inflexible fundamentalist religious conviction was the principal feature for the commission of the offence. This is the most startling and intransigent feature of the crime. It sets it apart from other criminal enterprises motivated by financial gain, by passion, anger or revenge.
The assumption underlying comments such as this is that terrorists cannot be rehabilitated. Or, at least, the very slight chance that they may be rehabilitated does not justify the risk to the community of releasing them earlier than would otherwise have been appropriate. Whether this assumption is correct is an open question. At last count, 13 convicted terrorists had been released (eight of the nine Pendennis terrorists; two of the nine convicted Operation Hammerli terrorists; and the three Tamil Tigers) (Jopson 2012) . The short period of time these men have been in the community since their release means that it is not possible to determine whether they have in fact been rehabilitated or will reoffend. However, studies conducted overseas reveal that the prospects of rehabilitation may not be as dim as suggested by the Australian courts. In Saudi Arabia, for example, it is claimed that rehabilitation programs established for Guantanamo Bay detainees have had a success rate of 80 to 90 percent (Seifer 2010 ; see also, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence 2010: 47-58). Singapore's rehabilitation programs have also achieved considerable success, with two thirds of detained individuals being released after, on average, only four years detention (Roach 2011: 140-142) . These rehabilitation programs, as with those in other countries, have concentrated upon religious re-education. The underlying assumption is that those who engage in terrorism are motivated by misinformation about the tenets of Islam and its attitude towards violence.
In R v Khawaja aggravating factors at sentencing beyond a reasonable doubt (R v Olbrich (1999) 199 CLR 270; see also Edney and Bagaric 2007: 142-145 At the very least, it can be said, in the present matter, that I am by no means satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offender has refused to budge from his former extremist view.
It continues to be the case in Australia that an absence of evidence that a person has moved away from their extremist views is a neutral (and not an aggravating) factor at sentencing. This does not answer, however, the critical question of what evidence the Australian courts will require to be satisfied that a person has good prospects of rehabilitation.
In sentencing the Operation Hammerli terrorists who had pled guilty prior to trial, Whealy J found that their guilty pleas could be taken, to a degree, 'to express remorse and acceptance of responsibility', as well as 'a drawing back by the offender from the extremist views that motivated the commission of the offences' (R (2006) 199 FLR 364 [74] ). In other words, the offenders had not given evidence at the sentencing hearing and therefore the prosecution was unable to cross-examine them as to their current mindset. None of you, not one, gave instructions to his counsel to say to this court, that you recanted from any extremist view that you held. That you no longer supported jihad, or terrorism, as being appropriate for pursuing the course of the Muslim faith. That is a significant factor because, each of you, whilst you hold those views remains a danger to the members of this community, and thus, protection of the community remains a very significant factor in sentencing you, as does personal deterrence.
Even if such instructions were given, it is questionable whether they would be regarded as a mitigating factor at sentencing. It would be understandable for the sentencing judge to have serious doubts about the self-serving nature of this evidence. ' (at [47] ). It is therefore critical to hand down harsh sentences to this vulnerable group in order to warn them away from being involved in terrorism. Finally, the extremist mindset of terrorists means that it is difficult to describe an offender's commission of a terrorism-related offence as merely being a youthful mistake.
Conclusion
Despite the limited jurisprudence in the anti-terrorism context, Australian courts have been quick to develop principles to be applied to the sentencing of convicted terrorists. The precise content of these principles is, in some cases, still unclear. However, three points may be derived from the jurisprudence.
First, the overwhelming determinant of the sentence handed down in a terrorism case is the objective seriousness of the offence. The starting point has been that all terrorism offences are serious. The maximum penalty set out in the legislation also provides some guidance. The courts will also, if the information is available, take into account the target of the planned terrorist act, the damage that the terrorists intend to cause and the proximity between the preparatory acts and the commission of a terrorist act.
Second, sentences imposed in respect of convicted terrorists are likely to be lengthy. This will be especially so where they have been convicted of conspiracy to do an act in preparation for a terrorist act. For such offences, Australian courts have handed down sentences of between 18 and 28 years. This presents a sharp contrast to the sentences handed down for comparable conduct where the charges were laid under other sections in Div 101 or under Div 102. Because of this there is a very strong possibility that, in the future, prosecutors will decide to charge persons with this offence rather than the other (less serious) terrorism offences in Divs 101 and 102 of the Criminal Code.
Third, factors that are typically taken into account during the sentencing process assume a secondary importance in the anti-terrorism context. These factors include the convicted person's age, family situation, employment history and criminal record. In R v Lodhi (2006) 199 FLR 364, Whealy J identified a number of features of Lodhi's life and circumstances that were in his favour. However, far from relying upon these factors to mitigate his sentence, Whealy J stated that these factors 'make it difficult to understand why a young man of excellent personal background, with a considerable professional work ethic, would have contemplated carrying out the very serious criminal actions that have brought him to his present position in these proceedings' (at 377). Most significantly, Australian courts have taken the view that the extremist views of terrorists mean that their prospects of rehabilitation are negligible at best. It is only where the convicted person pleads guilty that the courts have been willing to accept that he has moved away from those extremist views. 
